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DISSENT IN HIGH COURT REVENUE 
DECISIONS:  CHANGING 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 
INCIDENCE OF DISSENT 
Rodney Fisher* 
This paper draws on findings from a research project examining 
dissent in High Court revenue law cases. The paper initially outlines 
the findings in relation to the differences in the incidence of dissent 
that can be identified between different High Courts led by different 
Chief Justices.  
Drawing upon research relating to the changing jurisprudence of 
the High Court, particularly during the latter part of the 20th Century, 
the paper then further explores whether this changing jurisprudence 
can be said to be reflected in a changed incidence of dissent in revenue 
cases before the High Court, concluding that there is arguably some 
evidence that when the Court adopts excessively narrow 
jurisprudence, or alternatively an activist jurisprudence, this may be 
reflected in an increased incidence of dissent in revenue cases. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper draws on research from a research project 
examining dissent in High Court revenue law cases, with this 
paper examining in particular the incidence of dissent by 
different High Courts under the stewardship of different Chief 
Justices since the establishment of the High Court. 
Additionally, the paper also draws on existing research 
examining the evolving jurisprudence of the High Court in 
Australia, in particular in relation to the jurisprudence of post 
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World War II courts. The paper examines whether the evolution 
in the nature of the jurisprudence of the High Court is reflected 
in a changed incidence of dissent in the High Court in revenue 
matters. 
As explained in the paper, revenue decisions were selected 
for this research given the nature of revenue laws as imposing a 
non-voluntary pecuniary burden on taxpayers in the community. 
This creates the potential for courts to consider matters of 
fairness or justice in the operation of such laws, which may in 
turn engender greater potential for dissenting views to be 
manifest. It may be that the changing jurisprudence on the part 
of the High Court may be reflected in a changed incidence of 
dissent in revenue matters in circumstances where Justices find 
themselves at odds with the evolving jurisprudential orthodoxy 
of a particular High Court. 
The paper briefly outlines matters relating to the conduct of 
the research project and then examines the findings as to the 
incidence of dissent in revenue matters. There will be a focus on 
the incidence of dissent by different Justices on the High Court 
under the stewardship of different Chief Justices. The paper then 
explores whether the changing jurisprudence of the Court as it 
evolved through what may be seen as its more conservative and 
more activist phases, is reflected in a changed incidence of 
dissent being evidenced in revenue decisions. 
2. REVENUE CASES 
Cases identified as relevant to this project were revenue law 
cases determined by the High Court. The relevant revenue cases 
were drawn from the Commonwealth Law Reports (CLR) 
service, with CLR volumes from volume 1 to volume 245 being 
included in the research. While volume 245 did not coincide 
with a change in Chief Justice of the Court, with French CJ 
continuing as the Chief Justice past volume 245, it was 
considered that the inclusion of revenue cases determined under 
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the stewardship of French CJ may allow for the early 
identification of any trends in the incidence of dissent in the 
Court in relation to revenue law cases. 
In determining which cases would qualify as revenue cases 
for the purposes of this research, a number of alternative 
approaches could be followed. A narrow approach would limit 
revenue cases selected to those cases which determined the 
application or incidence of a particular revenue provision in a 
particular circumstance, an example being the determination of 
whether a particular receipt would be characterised as assessable 
income, or particular expense would be characterised as an 
allowable deduction. By contrast a wide approach would include 
those cases which were not determining the application of a 
particular revenue provision, but which included broadly all 
cases determining the imposition of taxation, including cases on 
the validity of revenue laws. Between the broad and narrow 
approaches would be varying alternative characterisations. 
The approach taken in this project has been a wide 
approach, thereby encompassing as revenue cases all cases 
dealing with the imposition, incidence, and application of 
revenue laws. Such an approach is preferable given the broader 
aims of the research, which are directed towards seeking to 
establish the nature of dissent in revenue matters, and the effect 
that dissenting judgments in revenue law may have on the 
development and shaping of the revenue law landscape in 
Australia. Using this criterion, in excess of 900 cases were 
identified as being revenue law cases for the purposes of this 
research project. 
3. CHARACTERISING DISSENT 
From within the identified class of revenue cases, a subset 
of cases needed to be characterised as including a dissenting 
judgment or dissenting judgments. It is considered that such a 
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characterisation is informed by brief reference to the history and 
nature of dissent. 
3.1 The Character of Dissent 
The tradition of a court delivering both a majority and 
dissenting judgments evolved from the 14
th
 Century English 
common law, whereby judges on appeal would deliver seriatim 
judgments with the majority opinion ruling.
1
 Fostering the 
tradition of dissent has been the procedure of the English 
tradition comprising oral hearings and extempore seriatim 
judgments, with no preliminary reading, no written arguments 
submitted, and no preliminary consultation between judges.
2
 
By contrast, the European civil law tradition had been for 
delivery of a single judgment of the court with no role for a 
dissenting voice, an example being the European Court of 
Justice that required all judges to sign the opinion of the court.
3
 
Part of the explanation for the difference in tradition may arise 
from the civil law career judiciary whereby the voice of the 
court is the voice of the State, with the law demanding a result 
which is inexorably the right answer expressed in a unanimous 
judgment.
4
 On this basis, civil judgments are an act of State 
which would not permit the expression of disagreement.
5
 
Additionally, civil law judgments do not have a formal status as 
                                                          
1
 The Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dube, ‘The Dissenting Opinion: 
Voice of the Future?’(2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 495, 499. 
2
 J Dyson Heydon, ‘Threats to Judicial Independence: The Enemy 
Within’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 205, 208.  
3
 See, for example John Alder, ‘Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: 
Tragic Choices? (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 221, 233. 
4
 Ruth Bader Ginsberg, ‘Remarks on Writing Separately’ (1990) 65 
Washington Law Review 133, 134. 
5
 Heydon, above n 2, 206. 
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Another explanation offered for the difference in legal 
tradition that has developed between the common law and civil 
law jurisdictions concerns the audience to whom the judgment is 
directed.
7
 The suggestion has been that European judgments, in 
particular German judgments, were addressed to academic 
scholars, whereas English judgments were directed to the losing 
party, their function being to render conclusive answers to the 
arguments of counsel.
8
 In such circumstances dissenting 
opinions may emerge, with the process characterised as 
a discussion between educated, informed and reasonable 
people who are all equal, about arguments which are closely 
tied to the facts and which are advanced by advocates as 
equals to those reasonable people, [which] can result in 




Despite the English common law tradition of dissenting 
opinions, with this tradition having been strongly followed by 
Australian courts, it should not be thought that the right to voice 
a dissenting opinion has been universally endorsed. 
One of the main arguments posited against the delivery of a 
dissenting judgment is that the dissent would increase 
uncertainty and weaken the standing of the court and the 
doctrine of stare decisis.
10
 This argument would suggest that 
unanimity, or at least the appearance of unanimity by the court, 
would buttress the authority of the court, and also engender 
                                                          
6
 Ruth Bader Ginsberg, above n 4, 137-138. 
7
 J Gillis Wetter, The Styles of Appellate Judicial Opinions: a Case 
Study in Comparative Law (A. W. Sythoff, 1960) 26. 
8
 Ibid, 72. 
9
 Heydon, above n 2, 206. 
10
 Alder, above n 3, 242.  
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community confidence in the court and the law more widely.
11
 
As White J of the Supreme Court of the United States stated, 
this view would hold that the ‘... only purpose which an 
elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is to weaken the effect 
of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of 
confidence in the conclusions of courts of last resort.’12 
It may be that this is particularly relevant to revenue law 
cases, where certainty of the law would be sought as a basis to 
allow for informed and legitimate tax planning by taxpayers. 
Further arguments advanced against delivering dissenting 
judgments centred on the view that dissent for its own sake has 
no value, and while ‘...some judges are more prone to indulge 
their individuality...’,13 the court is not the place for solo 
performances.  
The contrary view would suggest, in the words of Lord 
Bingham, that ‘... judicial independence [involves] 
independence from one’s colleagues,’14 and that far from 
generating uncertainty, a robust dissenting view can engender 
greater confidence in the judiciary and greater certainty. This 
argument suggests that dissent would not act to jeopardise the 
coherence of the law in a system where it is understood that 
there would be circumstances where it may be that the law may 




Indeed, it may be that dissent serves a useful purpose in that 
it may draw attention to perceived flaws in the reasoning of the 
majority view, ensuring accountability of the majority for the 




 Pollock v Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company 157 U.S. 429, 608 
(1895). 
13
 Ginsberg, above n 4, 142. 
14
 Quoted in Heydon, above n 2, 205. 
15
 L’Heureux-Dube, above n 1, 503.  
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rationale and consequences of their decision.
16
 Given the 
difficulties and complexities that abound in some areas of law, 
and the complexities that can exist within the factual matrix to 
which the law must be applied, it is hardly surprising that 
‘(d)isagreement on the law or its proper application nowadays is 
almost universally admitted to be inevitable some of the time.’17 
A greater threat to judicial independence is seen to arise, not 
from dissenting views, but from judicial majorities who may 
attempt to muzzle minorities where a dissenting voice may be 
seen to mar the conduct of the court.
18
 
Additionally, a dissenting voice may offer assurance to the 
community that all judges are performing their duty of 
accountability to the parties and the public, by independently 
giving their personal attention to the issues to be determined, 
and revealing what the judge actually thinks.
19
 What may be 
seen as more unsettling for the law than a high incidence of 
dissent would be a proliferation of separate opinions with no 
single opinion commanding a clear majority.
20
 
Whatever the merits or otherwise of dissenting judgments, a 
detailed examination of which is outside the scope of this paper, 
the High Court of Australia has developed a strong tradition of 
delivering dissenting opinions. Given that at the core of dissent 
lies the concept of disagreement, the question arising is the 
extent of that disagreement which would warrant classifying a 
decision as being a dissenting opinion.  
  
                                                          
16
 William J. Brennan Jr., ‘In Defense of Dissents’ (1986) 37 Hastings 
Law Journal 427, 430. 
17
 Ruth Bader Ginsberg, above n 4, 136. 
18
 Heydon, above n 2, 208-209. 
19
 Ibid, 215. 
20
 Ginsberg, above n 4, 148. 
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3.2 Dissent in Revenue Cases 
A key issue in the current research involved the 
determination of what is required for a separate judgment by a 
Justice to be classified as being in dissent. As recognised by 
previous research on dissenting opinions, the seriatim tradition 
followed by Australian courts creates difficulties with specific 
application of the terms of ‘majority’, ‘minority’, ‘dissent’ and 
‘concurrence’,21 with a wide range in the nature and range of 
disagreements that can occur between members of the Bench. 
While arguably an oversimplification, for the purposes of 
this research the approach taken has been that when a member 
of the court was not included in a joint majority judgment of the 
court making orders on a particular issue, their view may be 
classified as either a separate concurring opinion, a dissenting 
view, a contra view, or not expressing a view on a particular 
issue on the basis that the matter did not need to be decided.
22
 
This difficulty in classification may be compounded further 
when a particular Justice concurs with the orders made while 
expressing doubt as to the finding.
23
 
Further difficulty can arise in characterising a judgment as 
dissenting in those cases where the final orders of the court in a 
matter are not reflecting any clear majority view of the court, 
with the final orders representing consensus between different 
                                                          
21
 Andrew Lynch ‘Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring 
Judicial Disagreement in The High Court of Australia’ (2002) 24 
Sydney Law Review 470, 471. 
22
 See, eg, FCT v Thorogood (1927) 40 CLR 454, where Higgins J 
declined to give an opinion. 
23
 See, eg, Automatic Totalisators Ltd v FCT (1920) 27 CLR 523, 
where Isaacs and Rich JJ essentially concurred with the orders of the 
majority of Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ, but doubted the 
reasoning. 
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combinations of Justices on different elements,
24
 such decisions 
being referred to as plurality decisions.
25
 
It is suggested that in revenue law matters there may be a 
further layer of complexity that may not necessarily be apparent 
in all other areas of law, in that while there may be agreement as 
to the final orders to resolve the matter at issue, the paths of 
reasoning that led to that same conclusion may be vastly at odds. 
A ready example would be in determining whether a particular 
receipt should be included in assessable income. While there 
may be judicial agreement that the receipt should be assessable, 
this may be on the grounds of being ordinary income, or income 
from a profit making undertaking, or income from a business 
operation, or a capital gain, or income from trading stock. To 
argue that alternative reasoning which produced the same result 




The approach adopted in characterising dissent in this 
research follows that applied in other research on dissent,
27
 in 
that disagreement between Justices will only be classified as 
dissent when there is disagreement as to the outcome or final 
orders of the court, and not disagreement as to the path of 
reasoning to decide the matter. On this basis a judgment is 
characterised as dissenting in circumstances where a Justice 
                                                          
24
 See, eg, Hooper & Harrison Ltd (in liq) v FCT (1923) 33 CLR 458, 
where Isaacs & Rich JJ dissented on one issue and Knox CJ and Gavan 
Duffy J dissented on another issue, leaving Higgins J as the only 
Justice in full agreement with the order of the court. 
25
 See, for example, the discussion in Lynch, above n 21, 482. 
26
 See, for example, Shelley v FCT (1929) 43 CLR 208, where the full 
court excluded certain sums from taxable income; by Knox CJ and 
Dixon J on the basis that the entity was not a co-operative company, 
and by Isaacs J on the basis that the amounts were a diminution of 
expenditure and not income. 
27
 See, for example, Lynch, above n 21. 
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would determine a different resolution to the issue, which would 
include making a contra finding to the orders of the court. A 
judgment would not be dissenting if the Justice concurred with 
the final orders, or determined that a matter did not require 
determination. Such an approach is seen as the most effective 
way of addressing the difficulties outlined above.  
Given that this initial research is directed to addressing the 
relativities in the incidence of dissent, it is considered that if 
such an approach is applied consistently to all revenue cases 
extracted for use in the research, then it would provide an 
appropriate reflection of the relative incidence of dissent 
between Justices individually, and the relative incidence of 
dissent between courts under the stewardship of different Chief 
Justices. 
Applying this criterion of dissent to the revenue cases 
demonstrated dissenting judgments have been delivered in more 
than 300 cases, representing around 33% of the decided cases. 
While initially this may appear to be a relatively higher rate of 
dissent than may be expected in an area of law where certainty 
and clarity would be sought as a basis for taxpayers to operate 
within the revenue law system, it is of note that only four of the 
Justices since Federation have dissented in 20% or more of the 
revenue cases on which they sat in judgment.
28
 This appears to 
suggest that the rate of dissent in revenue cases is comprised of 
lower incidences of dissent by a large number of different 
Justices, but with different Justices dissenting in different cases, 
that is, the dissent is effectively ‘spread around’ among the 
Justices. 
  
                                                          
28
 Justice Kirby at 35%, Murphy J at 28%, Aickin J at 26% and 
Stephen J at 20%. 
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4. DISSENT IN DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS 
While it is recognised that statistics cannot tell the whole 
story,
29
 it is still considered useful to initially explore the 
average incidence of dissent by different High Courts, and the 
incidence of dissent by Justices serving on each of these Courts. 
The paper then draws on research into the changing 
jurisprudence of different High Courts, and examines whether 
this changing jurisprudence may seen to be reflected in this 
incidence of dissent for different High Courts. Further than 
considering the changing jurisprudence of the Courts, it is 
outside the scope of this paper to examine other contributing 
factors that may result in an incidence of dissent by a particular 
Justice or particular Court. This is not to suggest that there are 
no other factors, with such issues being the subject of ongoing 
research. 
Appendix A provides an illustration of the incidence of 
dissent in Courts under the stewardship of each of the Chief 
Justices since Federation. While it is recognised that reference to 
a court by reference to the Chief Justice leading the court ‘... is 
not a term which accurately describes the dynamics of the Court 
constituted by Justices of robust independence of mind, willing 
and able to give cogent expression to their own views’,30 it may 
be this very independence of mind which may be reflected in a 
greater propensity for dissent, particularly if a Justice is not 
comfortable with the prevailing jurisprudential ideology of the 
Court. 
It may not be surprising that the first High Court led by 
Griffith CJ exhibited a great degree of accord in revenue 
                                                          
29
 The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Dissent’ (2005) 12 James 
Cook University Law Review 7. 
30
 Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘A Tribute to Sir Anthony Mason’ in Cheryl 
Saunders (ed), Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in 
Australia (1996) 10.  
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decisions, with many of the decisions of the court being 
delivered by Griffith CJ. This harmonious honeymoon period 
lasted for around four years, during which the court was in 




It is noteworthy that throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century there was a general trend for increasing 
dissent in revenue matters, with dissent reaching its peak in the 
courts of Barwick CJ and Gibbs CJ, with both of these Courts 
having an incidence of dissent approaching 50%. These have 
been the only Courts with an average incidence of dissent above 
40%, and stand as a high-water mark for dissenting judgments 
in revenue law matters. In subsequent Courts the incidence of 
dissent has fallen from these high levels, but even in revenue 
judgments emanating from the Court of French CJ, the average 
incidence of dissent has not fallen to the levels witnessed in the 
first High Court. 
However, while the average incidence of dissent for a 
particular Court does provide an illustration of the variations of 
dissent among different Courts, it is suggested that further 
elucidation is provided by examining the relative incidences of 
dissent by the Justices serving on the Courts of each of the Chief 
Justices, particularly in relation to the proclivity of an individual 
Justice to dissent when serving under different Chief Justices. 
Appendix B depicts the incidence of dissent by each of the 
Justices sitting on revenue cases under each Chief Justice. The 
data on which these graphs are based may be used to allow a 
ready comparison of dissent by a particular Justice serving 
                                                          
31
 See, for example, Chandler & Co v Collector of Customs (1907) 4 
CLR 1719. The case highlighted the significance of the composition of 
the court, as Griffith CJ and Barton J were in dissent, with O’Connor, 
Isaacs and Higgins JJ in the majority. If the new appointments had not 
been made and there was still a three member bench, Griffith CJ and 
Barton J would have been in the majority.  
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under different Chief Justices. This data is available (at the time 
of printing) from the Journal of Australian Taxation website 
(www.jausttax.com). 
While the Court under Griffith CJ had a lower incidence of 
dissent than any subsequent court has since that time, the 
Justices most frequently in dissent were Isaacs and Powers JJ, 
who had relatively low incidences of dissent, but still dissented 
more often than other Justices. While Isaacs and Powers JJ 
maintained similar incidences of dissent during the period that 
Knox CJ led the Court, Higgins and Gavan Duffy JJ were much 
more prone to dissent from the majority decisions of the Court 
of Knox CJ than they had been on the Court of Griffith CJ. Rich 
J, who served under five Chief Justices, had low incidences of 
dissent on the Courts of Griffith CJ and Knox CJ, but found 
himself in dissent on revenue matters more than any other 
Justice on the Court of Isaacs CJ, and continued dissenting, 
although to a substantially reduced incidence, on the Courts of 
Gavan Duffy CJ and Latham CJ. 
In a similar vein, Starke J had a low incidence of dissent on 
the Court of Knox CJ, did not dissent on revenue matters at all 
on the Courts of Isaacs CJ and Gavan Duffy CJ, but had the 
second highest incidence of dissent on the Court of Latham CJ, 
being second only to Latham CJ himself. While the trend 
generally appears for any of the Chief Justices to have a low 
incidence of dissent on their own Court, which may not be 
surprising, Latham CJ would appear to have had more discord 
with own his Court on revenue matters than any other Chief 
Justice. 
When Dixon J joined the Court of Isaacs CJ, His Honour 
exhibited an incidence of dissent in approaching 15% of revenue 
law cases, and a slightly diminished incidence of dissent was 
maintained on the Court of Gavan Duffy CJ. However, the level 
of dissent diminished significantly when his Honour served on 
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the Court of Latham CJ, and remained low when his Honour led 
the Court as Chief Justice. 
By contrast, McTiernan J had low incidences of dissent in 
revenue cases while serving on the Courts of Gavan Duffy CJ 
and Latham CJ, but a much greater incidence of dissent while on 
the Courts of Dixon CJ and Barwick CJ. On the Court led by 
Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ dissented in 25% or more of 
the revenue law cases, while Dixon CJ and Williams, Fullager, 
Windeyer and Owen JJ each found themselves in dissent from 
the majority in fewer than 10% of revenue cases. 
On the Court led by Barwick CJ, McTiernan J had the 
second highest rate of dissent on the court in revenue cases, 
being second only to Murphy J who dissented in around 38% of 
revenue cases. Along with Murphy J, McTiernan, Kitto and 
Aickin JJ were the other Justices with an incidence of dissent of 
20% or greater. 
It would appear that the Court led by Barwick CJ has been 
the most volatile High Court since Federation in relation to 
revenue matters, having the second highest average rate of 
dissent in revenue cases, and also having the highest turnover of 
Justices. While Murphy, McTiernan Kitto and Aickin JJ had the 
higher incidences of dissent, most Justices were in dissent from 
the majority in revenue decisions between 10% and 20% of the 
time, with only Taylor, Mason and Wilson JJ dissenting in fewer 
than 10% of the revenue cases. Barwick CJ himself dissented 
from the majority decision in around 13% of revenue cases, 
being among the higher incidences of dissent for a Chief Justice 
on their own Court.
32
 
While the High Court under the leadership of Gibbs CJ 
exhibited a marginally higher average incidence of dissent than 
                                                          
32
 Chief Justice Latham dissented in 17% of revenue cases while Chief 
Justice, Gibbs CJ and Gavan Duffy CJ in 14% of revenue cases, and 
Isaacs CJ in 13% of revenue cases. 
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the Barwick CJ Court, it is notable that Murphy J appeared 
much more comfortable with the majority views of the Court, 
dissenting in around only 10% of revenue cases, a similar 
incidence of dissent to that exhibited by Mason J. At the other 
extreme, Aickin J dissented in over 35% of cases, and Stephen J 
dissented in nearly 30% of revenue cases, higher than his 
Honour’s 19% incidence of dissent while serving on the 
Barwick CJ Court. 
Since the time of the Gibbs CJ Court there has been a 
decline in the incidence of dissent in revenue law cases decided 
by the High Court. The Courts of Mason CJ, Brennan CJ and 
Gleeson CJ all exhibited an average incidence of dissent 
approaching 40%, a 10% decline from the high incidences of 
dissent on the Courts of Barwick CJ and Gibbs CJ. However, 
what may be of greater interest is the incidence of dissent by 
individual Justices on these Courts. 
The Court of Mason CJ witnessed only McHugh J 
exhibiting an incidence of dissent in more than 20% of the 
revenue cases, while Wilson J did not dissent in revenue cases 
on any occasion. By contrast, on the Court of Brennan CJ, 
McHugh J was joined by Deane, Callinan and Hayne JJ in not 
dissenting at all in revenue cases, with Dawson, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ dissenting in more than 15% of revenue law 
decisions. 
While serving on the Court of Brennan CJ, Kirby J had a 
relatively low incidence of dissent at around 13%. However, his 
Honour appears to have been much more in discord with the 
Courts of Gleeson CJ and French CJ, delivering dissenting 
judgments in over 35% of revenue cases on the Gleeson CJ 
Court, and in 50% of revenue law cases heard by the French CJ 
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Court.
33
 Apart from Kirby J, there was a great degree of 
agreement and uniformity from other Justices on these Courts, 
and while the average incidence of dissent may not appear low, 
without the dissents of Kirby J, the Courts of Gleeson CJ and 
French CJ would have exhibited the lowest incidences of dissent 
in High Court revenue cases, even falling below the incidence of 
dissent of the Griffith CJ High Court. 
As evidenced by the Appendices, the Gleeson CJ Court saw 
no dissent in revenue decisions from Hayne, Heydon, Crennan 
and Kiefel JJ, while the French CJ Court had witnessed no 
dissent in the cases extracted for the research from French CJ 
and Gummow J. Apart from Kirby J, all other Justices who had 
dissented had very low incidences of dissent. 
This decline in the incidence of dissent from more recent 
Courts may appear counter-intuitive. 
It was during this period that the number of revenue cases 
reaching the High Court was in decline. This decline in the cases 
was hastened by the requirement, introduced in 1984, for a grant 
of special leave to appeal to the High Court,
34
 thus providing the 
court with a discretion for case selection. Following this, the 
1987 enactment of the Australia Acts
35
 established the High 
Court as the final court of appeal for Australia, giving the court 
added responsibility for making final determinations. It may 
have been expected that the combination of these factors would 
not only reduce the number of revenue cases, but simultaneously 
increase the complexity of the cases which needed to be finally 
                                                          
33
 It should be noted that only four revenue cases were heard by Kirby 
J on the French High Court, with his Honour dissenting in two of these 
four cases. 
34
 Introduced by the sec 3(1) Judicial Amendment Act (No 2) 1984 
(Cth). 
35
 Australia Act 1986 (Cth), Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1986 
(Cth), Australia Acts Request Act 1985 (each state), Australia Act 1986 
(UK). 
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determined, and that this increased complexity may have led to 
a greater incidence of dissent, as the legal and factual 
complexity of cases reaching the Court could result in more 
divergent opinions of Justices, which would manifest as a 
dissenting view. 
One potential explanation for this greater degree of accord 
may be that many of the more recent Justices serving on the 
High Court have a background in areas of law other than 
revenue law, and there may be a greater willingness on the part 
of Justices to be persuaded as to a conclusion by stronger 
personalities on the Court.
36
 While this suggestion is purely 
speculative in relation to revenue law matters, it may appear 
unusual that with the greatly increasing complexity of revenue 
law, and the greatly increased factual complexity of revenue 
issues reaching the High Court for determination, there has 
generally been a higher level of accord among most of the 
Justices as to the outcome than had been the case for most of the 
twentieth century.  
However, whatever the cause, apart from some notable 
exceptions more recent Courts have witnessed a significant 
decline in dissenting views in revenue cases. With the Court of 
Gleeson CJ, and from the cases extracted from the French CJ 
Courts, most Justices, with the notable exception of Kirby J, 
appear to be in furious agreement on an area of law that causes 
so much difficulty and so much angst for so many practitioners. 
5. HIGH COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND JUDICIAL 
DISSENT 
The remainder of this paper has regard to research that has 
examined the changing nature of the broad jurisprudential 
ideology adopted by the High Court under the leadership of 
different Chief Justices, with the purpose of then exploring 
                                                          
36
 See, for example, Heydon, above n 2. 
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whether the change in ideology between different Courts may be 
seen as being reflected in the incidence of dissent in revenue 
cases.  
If it is the case, as is now generally accepted, that Justices 
can play a pivotal role in making and developing the law, rather 
than just ‘finding’ the law that exists and applying that law, then 
the composition of  Justices sitting on a Court can evidently 
impact on the pace of the development of law. The approach to 
statutory interpretation adopted by a Justice would be expected 
to be shaped by a number of considerations, not least of which 
would be expected to be the jurisprudential philosophy 
embraced by that Justice, although it should be recognised that 
classification of a Justice to a particular school of thought may 
be fraught with doubt, as the Justice’s philosophical outlook 
may be expected to evolve over time. 
This shaping of interpretive approaches by jurisprudential 
philosophical leanings may particularly impact decisions in 
revenue cases, dealing as they do with the broad issue of non-
voluntary individual pecuniary contributions to the state, which 
becomes interwoven with views as to the proper role for, and 
level of involvement by, the state, and the concepts of fairness 
and justice in relation to the power balance between the state 
and individuals. 
In recognising that judicial techniques are influenced by 
many factors other than doctrine, such factors encompassing 
both individual and institutional factors, there is a suggestion 
that from the mid-1950s Australian judges were exposed to a 
range of pressures to which they had not previously been 
subjected.
37
 Also during this same period there had been a 
change not only in society in general, but in the backgrounds of 
judges, with judges in the early post mid-1950s period having 
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shared the national agony and unpleasant experiences, having 
lived through the Great Depression and World Wars, with many 
having served in war. The suggestion is that these broadening 
experiences helped put legislation in perspective. From the 




Given the suggestion that it is the period since the mid-
1950s that has witnessed a change in the experiences shaping 
the views of judges, that most interest has been directed to the 
jurisprudence of the High Court since the mid-1950s, and that it 
has been during this period that there has been the suggestion of 
a change in jurisprudential ideology of the High Court, it is 
appropriate that this part of the paper focus its attention on the 
High Courts since that period. A further reason for limiting most 
of the discussion to this period is that this period has witnessed a 
consistently high average incidence of dissent in revenue cases 
since the Court of Barwick CJ. 
5.1 Interpreting Revenue Law 
The approach to interpretation of revenue statutes was set 
early in the High Court’s history, with Griffith CJ endorsing a 
literal approach, being to determine the intent of the revenue 
legislation from the words of the statute, absent any ambiguity 
or imprecision in the words of the legislation. In Tasmania v 
Commonwealth and South Australia,
39
 his Honour drew on a 
passage from Lord Chief Justice Tindal to explain that:  
the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that 
they should be construed according to the intent of the 
Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of a statute are 
in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be 
necessary than to expound these words in their natural and 
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ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case 
best declare the intention of the law-giver.
40
 
The traditional interpretation to be applied to statutes 
imposing a penalty on the community, as with penal or revenue 
provisions, suggested that the statute should be interpreted 
strictly but not so as to defeat the purpose of the legislature, as 
explained by Isaacs J in Scott v Cawsey:
41
  
When it is said that penal Acts or fiscal Acts should receive a 
strict construction, I apprehend that it amounts to nothing 
more than this. Where Parliament has in the public interest 
thought fit … to extract from individuals certain contributions 
to the general revenue, a Court should be specially careful … 
to ascertain and enforce the actual commands of the 
legislature, not weakening them in favour of private person to 
the detriment of the public welfare, nor enlarging them as 
against the individuals towards whom they are directed.
42
 
5.2 Legalism and Literalism 
In terms of the interpretation of revenue statutes, arguably 
the Justice who has had the most significant lasting impact has 
been Sir Own Dixon, during his time as both a Justice and Chief 
Justice on the High Court. Chief Justice Dixon has been the 
High Court jurist most identified with what has been labelled the 
legalistic approach, probably due to his own comments on being 
sworn in as Chief Justice when he described himself as 
‘excessively legalistic’ and expressing faith in a ‘strict and 
complete legalism’ as the only safe guide to judicial decisions in 
the face of conflict.
43
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However, while Dixon CJ may have adhered to a legalist 
approach, there is evidence that his legalism was not narrowly 
confined in that he did not seek to impose narrow limits on 
relevant considerations in determining cases, and did not seek to 
deny the political character of relevant considerations nor the 
practical significance of High Court decisions.
44
 Rather, Dixon 
CJ’s legalism allowed that the common law was not frozen and 
immobile, but contemplated change in the law as legitimate and 
that the judiciary had a role to play in this change. Such change, 
however, needed to be effected by an incremental growth in 
existing rules or a rational extension of existing rules to new 
instances, rather than by innovation.
45
 As noted by his Honour: 
It is one thing for a court to seek to extend the application of 
accepted principles to new cases or to reason from the more 
fundamental of settled legal principles to new conclusions or 
to decide that a category is not closed against unforseen 
instances which in reason might be subsumed thereunder. It is 
an entirely different thing for a judge, who is discontented 
with a result held to flow from a long accepted legal principle, 
deliberately to abandon the principle in the name of justice or 
of social necessity or of social convenience.
46
 
The great virtue seen in this incremental legalist approach of 
Dixon CJ was that it ‘... subordinated individual judicial whim 
to the collective experience of generations of earlier judges out 
of which could be extracted principles hammered out in 
numerous struggles.’47 
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This broader approach to legalism has been contrasted with 
the stricter and more narrowly confined approaches of the Chief 
Justices who both preceded and followed Dixon CJ, being 
Latham CJ, who was seen as having greater regard to the letter 
of the law,
48
 and Barwick CJ, whose tenure is examined later in 
the paper.  
In looking to the changes in the incidence of dissent in 
revenue cases between the court of Latham CJ and the court of 
Dixon CJ, it is noteworthy that the Justices with the highest 
incidences of dissent on the court of Dixon CJ were McTiernan 
and Webb JJ, who both dissented in 25% or more of cases. For 
both of these Justices this represented a significant increase 
above their incidence of dissent on the Latham CJ court. There 
was also a marked increase in the occurrence of dissent by Kitto 
J, who had always been with the majority on the court of 
Latham CJ, but had an incidence of dissent approaching 15% 
under Dixon CJ. However, while the average incidence of 
dissent was marginally higher in revenue law cases for the court 
of Dixon CJ, there was exhibited an incidence of dissent of less 
than 10% by Dixon CJ himself, along with Williams, Fullager, 
Windeyer and Owen JJ.  
The figures reflecting the incidence and incidence of dissent 
would appear to suggest that McTiernan and Webb JJ were 
arguably more comfortable with the narrower legalist approach 
of Latham CJ than the arguably broader legalism of Dixon CJ.  
5.3 A Narrower Strict Literalism 
While legalism and literalism may be distinguished, there is 
much overlap, with legalism relying on the text as being of 
primary significance, while recognising that meaning can be 
deduced from an understanding of the words within a wider 
context of authoritative material.
49
 It is suggested that this 
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approach of wide legalism was broadly the approach of courts in 
revenue cases until the court of Barwick CJ, with the court of 




This was particularly the case in revenue matters involving 
anti-avoidance legislation. In a series of revenue decisions 
which favoured taxpayers at the expense of the revenue 
generally, Barwick CJ himself applied strict literalism to read 
down legislative anti-avoidance provisions to the stage where 
they became largely ineffective, and in doing so appeared to 
display what almost amounted to an admiration for the 
taxpayer’s position, as evidenced in FCT v Westraders,51 where 
His Honour characterised the taxpayer’s claim as ‘... an 
ingenious use of the provisions ... of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act.’52 Arguably the Barwick CJ Court applied strict literalism 
within a broadly legalistic context to subvert the intent of the 
revenue law. 
Rather than seeking the legislative purpose or intent from 
the words in the legislation, the approach of the Court led by the 
Chief Justice appears to have been to look only at the words 
themselves, and unless the words themselves envisaged the 
particular matter at issue, then the statute was seen to not have 
any application. This approach has been described as the court 
taking ‘a parsing approach rather than a purposive approach’,53 
and by so doing the Court was able to dilute the legislative 
provisions to the point of being ineffective. 
In justifying this narrow literalist approach, Barwick later 
argued that ‘The obligation to pay [taxes] is a legal one. Some 
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politicians try to treat it as a moral obligation. But it is not.’54 A 
fellow Justice on the Barwick court commented that there was 
on the Barwick court ‘... a strong feeling of animosity directed 
towards revenue generally. This was led by Barwick. That was 
fairly dominant in the Court ...’55 
Such an expression of opinion by Barwick lends support to 
the earlier proposition that the nature of revenue cases, invoking 
notions of fairness and justice, may engender divergent 
jurisprudential views between Justices, with the potential to 
create dissenting views. 
From Appendix A, the Court of Barwick CJ exhibited a high 
average incidence of dissent, being only marginally below the 
highest average incidence of dissent by a High Court. On its 
face, this lends support to the view that the move to a more 
narrow jurisprudential approach has been reflected in a greater 
average incidence of dissent by the Court. However, it is 
suggested that it is instructive to look behind the average 
incidence of dissent by the Court, to the dissent by individual 
Justices on the Court. 
It is suggested that not all Justices on the Barwick CJ Court 
appeared totally comfortable with this narrow approach in 
revenue law matters, as evidenced by the increase in the 
incidence of dissent witnessed from the Barwick Court when 
compared with the Dixon Court. The Barwick Court evidenced a 
widespread incidence of dissent among a number of the Justices.  
The Justice with the greatest incidence of dissent in revenue 
cases on the Barwick CJ Court was Murphy J, who, it has been 
suggested, derided the traditional approach of the Court, and 
espoused the view that as judges make the law, they should 
bring it up to date, changing it openly and not by an incremental 
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approach.
56
 Justice Murphy was seen as not constrained by the 
legalistic approach of seeking to identify an existing body of law 
from which answers were to be found, but had regard to the 
wider social and political values influencing and being impacted 
by the decisions of the Court.
57
 It is for this reason that it has 
been suggested that his appointment in 1975 heralded the 
commencement if the demise of legalism,
58
 and while there is 
the suggestion that he influenced the views of other Justices 
such as Mason J, any such influence became apparent after his 
death. 
However, Murphy J was not alone, with a number of the 
Justices exhibiting incidences of dissent of around 15% or more 
in the revenue cases heard, with McTiernan, Kitto and Aickin JJ 
also dissenting in 20% or more of the cases on which they sat, 
while Gibbs and Stephen JJ dissented in more than 15% of their 
cases. Such an incidence of dissent had been unusual in previous 
courts, and also in more recent subsequent courts. This 
incidence of dissent is seen as even more notable, given the 
level of influence and control by Barwick CJ over the Court, and 
Barwick CJ’s animonsity to revenue imposition generally. 
As noted, another Justice with a higher incidence of dissent 
on the Barwick CJ Court was McTiernan J, and it is of interest 
that while his Honour had dissented more on the Dixon CJ 
Court than that of Latham CJ, presumably preferring the stricter 
legalistic approach of Lathan CJ, his incidence of dissent 
continued on the Barwick CJ Court, dissenting in some 25% of 
revenue cases, suggesting a degree of discomfort with the strict 
literalism of Barwick CJ. 
The Justices who would have appeared to be more at ease 
with the approach of the Barwick CJ Court were Taylor, Mason 
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and Wilson JJ, all of whom had an incidence of dissent of less 
than 10%. Of particular interest is that while serving on the 
courts of Barwick CJ and Gibbs CJ, Mason J had a low 
incidence of dissent in revenue cases, suggesting that his 
Honour was comfortable with the narrow legalism and literalism 
of these courts, and yet after assuming the role of Chief Justice, 
his Honour was seen to shun such an approach and instead lead 
a court that has been characterised as an activist court. 
What is also of interest is the incidence of dissent by 
Barwick CJ himself. While not a high incidence of dissent, at 
some 13%, it is among the higher incidences of dissent by a 
Chief Justice, with Latham CJ being most in discord with his 
own Court, dissenting in some 17% of revenue cases. This 
suggests that neither Latham CJ nor Barwick CJ were able to 
dispose other Justices to their views to the same extent seen 
from more recent Chief Justices. 
While recognising that a range of factors would influence 
the propensity of individual Justices to issue dissenting 
judgments, it is suggested, on the basis of the discussion above, 
that it is at least arguable that the move from a broader legalism 
to a narrow literalism in the approach of the Court can go some 
way to partly explaining the increased incidence of dissent in 
revenue cases. As noted, dissent was not limited to one Justice, 
with a number of the Justices serving on the Court dissenting in 
revenue decisions. 
The Court under Gibbs CJ has been seen as a stepping stone 
to the Court under Mason CJ,
59
 with the view being expressed 
that Gibbs CJ was a more orthodox judge than Barwick CJ, 
although not exercising the same incidence of control.
60
 The 
Gibbs Court has been characterised as less conservative than the 
Barwick Court, and while the incidence of dissent in revenue 
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cases under Gibbs CJ was marginally higher than under Barwick 
CJ, the Court itself did not appear as fractured, with only 
Stephen and Aickin JJ dissenting in more than 25% of cases 
they heard, with Aickin J dissenting in more than 35% of these 
revenue cases. While these suggest some incidence of discord 
within the Court, it is of interest that Murphy J dissented in just 
over 10% of cases, the same incidence of dissent as seen from 
Mason J, and considerably less than witnessed from Murphy J 
on the Barwick CJ Court, suggesting more accord with the 
Court of Gibbs CJ on revenue matters. 
One explanation for this greater incidence of dissent on the 
Gibbs CJ High Court may be that Justices felt less restrained 
under Gibbs CJ, as he did not exercise the same level of control 
as had Barwick CJ, and Justices may have felt less constrained 
about delivering a dissenting opinion. 
5.4 Judicial Activism 
While legal formalism had dominated the approach of the 
High Court for much of the twentieth century, placing a 
premium on logic, deduction, and a robust commitment to stare 
decisis, the Court of Mason CJ witnessed legal realism securing 
a foothold in the judicial culture.
 61
 
While legalism recognised an evolution in the law, it 
envisaged an incremental evolution, precluding consideration of 
matters such as political value judgments and policy 
considerations. If the appointment of Murphy J was seen as the 
start of the demise of legalism as the prevailing orthodoxy, then 
the change from legalism to what has been termed judicial 
activism reached its high point during the tenure of Mason CJ as 
Chief Justice. Rather than return to the broader approach of 
legalism, following the narrow literalism of the Barwick era, the 
Mason CJ High Court saw the pendulum swing further in the 
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other direction, with the Court being seen as taking an activist 
approach. 
 If the Court of Gibbs CJ was seen as a stepping stone to the 
Mason CJ Court, it was the Mason CJ Court which shifted the 
focus away from simply resolving legal disputes to addressing 
policy issues.
62
As noted in relation to the Mason High Court: 
The Court shifted its institutional focus away from simply 
resolving legal disputes to making policy that addressed some 
of the country’s most controversial issues. Fairness, not 
certainty, became the Court’s watchword, and as a result it 
employed new, controversial modes of legal reasoning.
63
 
The term of judicial activism has been applied in 
circumstances where judicial decisions are viewed in a wider 
political context, with the court recognising the roles for 
community values and judicial policy considerations.
64
 Such an 
approach witnessed a change away from black letter law and 
strict literalism, recognising that there may be more than one 
plausible interpretation of a statute, leaving some discretion on 
the part of the Court.
65
 This approach of looking to fairness, and 
having regard to community values and economic or social 
consequences of decisions has particular relevance to revenue 
law decisions, as the decisions of the Court will have both a 
pecuniary impact on the taxpayer and a fiscal impact on the 
revenue. 
As may be expected, a change from legalism to a more 
activist or realist approach by the High Court was not met with 
universal endorsement, with the suggestion that judicial activism 
meant: 
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using judicial power for a purpose other than that for which it 
was granted, namely doing justice according to law in the 
particular case. It means serving some function other than 
what is necessary for the decision of a particular dispute ... 
often the illegitimate function is the furthering of some 
political, moral or social program,,: the law is seen not as the 
touchstone by which the case in hand is to be decided, but as 
a possible starting point
66
 
The average incidence of dissent by the Mason High Court 
was lower than that witnessed under the Barwick Court, but 
remained at an incidence of almost 40%, being higher than all 
Courts other than the Courts of Barwick CJ and Gibbs CJ. This 
again appears to suggest that, on the basis of the figures, the 
move to a more activist jurisprudential approach may be 
reflected in the higher average incidence of dissent by the Court. 
Again, it is instructive to look to the dissent by individual 
Justices on the Mason Court. 
While the incidence of dissent in revenue cases fell from the 
higher levels witnessed on the courts of Barwick CJ and Gibbs 
CJ, there would not appear to have been universal accord in the 
revenue decisions of the Court. Mason CJ and Wilson J had the 
lowest incidences of dissent, with low levels of dissent not seen 
since the early High Courts. McHugh J appeared most at odds 
with an activist approach in revenue cases, dissenting in more 
than 20% of cases, still considerably lower than the high 
incidence of dissent evident on the courts of Latham CJ, 
Barwick CJ, Gibbs CJ and even Dixon CJ. 
The suggestion has been that it was Mason CJ, Deane, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ who formed a majority group prepared 
to make changes.
67
 In revenue cases this is not entirely borne out 
by the incidence of dissent, with Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ 
all dissenting in 10% or more of cases, although again this is a 
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low incidence of dissent when compared with some other 
Courts. Justice Dawson has been seen as one of the more 
conservative Justices on the Mason High Court, and this is 
reflected in an incidence of dissent above 15%. Brennan J also 
dissented in more than 15% of revenue cases, which although 
historically is still a low incidence of dissent, suggests some 
level of unease with an activist approach in revenue cases, 




Based on these figures, it is suggested that, just as the 
evidence appeared to suggest an increased incidence of dissent 
in revenue matters when the Barwick High Court moved from a 
broad legalism to adopt a narrow strict literalism, so too the 
evidence appears to suggest a higher than average incidence of 
dissent on the Mason Court in revenue matters, when the 
pendulum had swung in the other direction to a more activist 
approach. Of the Justices who served on the High Court under 
Mason CJ, half of the Justices had an incidence of dissent in 
nearly 15% or more of the cases on which they sat. This would 
appear to suggest a degree of discomfort by some Justices with 
the activist approach of the Court. 
The suggestion that arises from the figures as to the 
incidence of dissent is that when a Court has departed from what 
may be seen as the traditional jurisprudential approach of broad 
legal formalism, which appears to have dominated the approach 
of the High Court for much of its life, the change in 
jurisprudential approach may, to a degree, be reflected in an 
increased incidence of dissent. It is not suggested that the 
changed jurisprudence explains all of the change in the 
incidence of dissent, but that the change in jurisprudence is itself 
reflected in the increased incidence of dissent. 
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5.5 Retreat of Activism 
It has been noted that ‘If the Gibbs Court experienced 
judicial rumblings about the orthodoxy, justices on the Brennan 
Court aired their misgivings and uncertainties about many of the 
revolutionary changes wrought under Mason.’69 This heralded a 
return to an approach closer to the legalism that the Court had 
more traditionally followed, with the year 1995 having been 
identified as the beginning of a gradual rollback in the 
popularity among Justices for a more activist judicial role,
70
 and 
although the number of revenue cases before the Brennan Court 
was not large, the variability in the incidence of dissent is 
interesting. 
On the Mason Court, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ were 
seen as a majority prepared to make change, while Dawson J 
had taken a more conservative approach. However, on the 
Breannan Court, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ exhibited vast 
differences in the propensity to dissent in revenue cases, with 
Deane J not dissenting at all, while Toohey and Gaudron JJ 
dissented in over 15% and 25% of cases respectively, with 
Dawson J also dissenting in more than 20% of cases. 
Additionally, when Kirby J joined the Court, his Honour 
dissented in less than 15% of cases, although overall he has the 
highest incidence of dissent in revenue cases.
71
 
Also of interest on the Brennan CJ, Gleeson CJ and French 
CJ
72
 Courts has been the number of Justices who have not felt 
the need to deliver a dissenting judgment at all in revenue cases. 
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 Justice Kirby dissented in around 35% of revenue cases on which his 
Honour sat. 
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The rollback of the popularity of a more politicised role has 
been seen as being quickened with the appointment of Gleeson 
CJ,
73
 with the Gleeson Court having been generally seen as 
more conservative. While the Gleeson High Court has been 
characterised as placing stronger reliance on past decisions, and 
avoiding in engaging in policy type matters, there had not been a 
complete return to the pre-Mason CJ strict legalism and 
literalism of earlier Courts, with the Court seen as willing to 




Although returning to the more traditional jurisprudential 
norm in the approach of the Court, the Gleeson Court witnessed 
an average incidence of dissent similar to that displayed by the 
Mason Court. Again, however, the incidence of dissent by 
individual Justices is of more interest, with Kirby J, having an 
incidence of dissent above 35%, being the only Justice to dissent 
in more than 10% of cases. 
The average incidence of dissent for the French Court fell to 
a level similar to the earlier Court of Isaacs CJ, but again there 
has been great variability if the incidence of dissent by 
individual Justices. The figures for the French Court are not 
complete, with his Honour continuing as Chief Justice after the 
cases considered in this research project. 
As noted, despite the overall incidence of dissent being 
above 20%, it has only been the higher incidence of dissent by 
Kirby J on the Gleeson and early French courts which has 
resulted in this overall level of dissent. Apart from Kirby J, the 
Justices on the Courts have shown an even greater degree of 
accord than was evident on the early High Court of Griffith CJ, 
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with a number of Justices not dissenting on revenue cases at all. 
Without the incidence of dissent from Kirby J, the courts would 
have the lowest rates of dissent of all High Courts since 
Federation. 
As noted earlier, this low incidence of dissent in revenue 
cases may be seen as a little surprising given the requirement to 
seek leave to appeal to the High Court, whereby it would be 
expected that revenue cases reaching the High Court would be 
the more complex and contentious of the cases. Apart from the 
return to a more traditional jurisprudential approach there may 




While speculative, it may be that the retreat from an activist 
approach has generated a desire by Justices to present a ‘united 
front’, particularly in revenue cases where much turns on the 
judgment in terms of tax planning. There may be a view that 
avoiding dissent in revenue cases may engender greater 
certainty in relation to the interpretation of revenue statues and 
tax planning. This suggestion would be intricately linked to the 
method of operation of any particular court, and whether 
Justices engage in pre-hearing discussions, and whether there is 
an attempt to reach some element of consensus, all of which 
would be a reflection of the style of the serving Chief Justice. It 
is outside the scope of this paper to explore these areas further. 
Whatever the underlying explanation, it would appear that 
the more recent High Courts have seen a greater degree of 
accord, with less dissent by individual Justices, than at any time 
since the first High Court in 1903.  
It is suggested that this return to a lower incidence of dissent 
when the Court follows a more traditional form of jurisprudence 
provides some further evidence for the suggestion that the 
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jurisprudence of a particular High Court is arguably reflected in 
the incidence of dissent in revenue law cases, with a reduced 
incidence of dissent when the Court has returned to a more 
traditional legalism as the underlying jurisprudential approach. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has been concerned to examine the incidence of 
dissent in High Court revenue decisions, looking to differences 
in dissent between different High Courts, and any potential 
relationship between this incidence of dissent and the prevailing 
jurisprudential approach of the Court. 
By way of background, the approach to the identification of 
revenue decisions has been outlined, in addition to the features 
characterising a judgment as being in dissent in a particular 
case. This characterisation of a judgment as being in dissent is 
drawn from the history of the nature of the dissenting opinion, 
and the arguments posited both in favour, and against, the 
tradition of the expression of a dissenting view. 
While generally the overall incidence of dissent appears to 
have been higher in revenue cases than may have been expected 
from an area of law which craves certainty, there has been 
variability between the propensity towards judicial dissent on 
different High Courts under the stewardship of different Chief 
Justices. While early High Courts witnessed relatively low 
incidences of dissent, there would appear to have been a greater 
incidence of dissent in Courts towards the latter part of the 
twentieth century, starting with the Court led by Barwick CJ, 
and continuing to the Courts led by Mason CJ and Brennan CJ. 
Since that time the incidence of dissent has fallen again, apart 
from the regular dissent of Kirby J. 
In looking to whether the changing jurisprudence of the 
High Court is reflected in the incidence of dissent in revenue 
cases, it is suggested that it would be too simplistic an approach 
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to suggest that the jurisprudential approach of the court would 
fully explain changes in the incidence of dissent between 
different High Courts. There would be a number of factors 
contributing to the propensity of Justices to dissent in revenue 
cases, ranging from characteristics particular to an individual 
Justice to institutional factors, both within and external to the 
court itself. 
However, it is suggested that, on the basis of the foregoing 
discussion, there is some evidence from the figures to suggest 
that, particularly when the jurisprudential philosophy of the 
court has varied from what may be seen as the established 
orthodoxy for much of the life of the High Court, more Justices 
are more likely to experience a degree of discomfort with the 
newly prevailing orthodoxy, as evidenced by an increased 
incidence of dissenting judgments. This appears to be the case 
whether the jurisprudential pendulum swings towards a 
narrower conservatism, as with the Barwick Court, or to a more 
liberal and activist approach as with the Mason Court. Both the 
narrow literalism of the Barwick Court and the activism of the 
Mason Court have witnessed a greater incidence of dissent in 
revenue cases, with the incidence of dissent falling when the 
jurisprudence of the Court returned to the more traditional 
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Appendix B – Dissent by Justices serving under each 
Chief Justice  
Court of Griffith CJ 
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Court of Isaacs CJ 
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Court of Latham CJ 
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Court of Barwick CJ 
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Court of Mason CJ 
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Court of Gleeson CJ 
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